COUNTER PROLIFERATION
By
Sana Danish (Research Fellow)
April 10, 2009
The ad hoc mechanisms such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI), United Nations Resolution 1540 (UNSCR 1540) and Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) are described as a multifaceted approach to prevent proliferation and nuclear terrorism and are together referred to as Counter Proliferation (CP) Initiatives.
The 9/11 terrorist attacks created an environment to intensify the interest in pursuing such initiatives that are mainly the US-dominated and are not treaty based, hence comprise ‘coalition of the willing’.
The emphasis has been laid on possible threat of seaborne terrorism as well as aerial attacks. Seaports and containerised shipping is, however, considered the potent victim for delivering weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and has made it imperative that the security of containers be taken care of. The CSI and PSI were, therefore, launched to provide means that are institutionally less constrained and are a rapid response to the security issues. The CSI protects containerised shipping and addresses border security concerns. The multidisciplinary teams of US officers are stationed by the US Customs and Border Security Program at the participating ports to screen the high-risk containers destined for the US. The Bin Qasim Port of Pakistan is a party to the programme. The stationing of US officers at Pakistani port raises several issues with regard to the security and sovereignty of the country, including their possible intrusion into local port jurisdiction, enforcement and strategic imports.
Pakistan’s compliance with the programme has put enormous financial burden on the country because the advanced technology is needed for inspection and port operations. And the participating port also needs to submit detailed electronic reports to the US Customs besides upgrading to new smart container technologies for shipping to the US. Hence, a comprehensive multilateral agreement on the use of containers in international trade should be pursued rather than entering into numerous bilateral agreements. So Pakistan, with the help of China and some other countries, should take an initiative of negotiating a global agreement on container security.
The PSI again is not a treaty-based approach. It is described as “political arrangement” of likeminded countries with the sole objective of interdicting “WMD trafficking at sea, in the air, and on land.” The participating states volunteer to share information and agree to cooperate with each other in specific actions when the need arises. Endorsing the PSI would mean that a state would allow aggressive interdiction of the suspected vessels passing through its seas.
And not just that, the endorsement of the PSI means endorsing the 14 interdiction principles eventually meaning that a state is compelled to commit to board suspicious vessels flying their own flag in international waters, board the suspected vessels passing through their seas, and should agree to allow other PSI member states to board their own vessels too. The contention for Pakistan is that since it is a nuclear weapon state, the endorsement of the PSI might lead to implicate it. Since this is an ad hoc arrangement and is non-treaty based, it is lacking legality. Pakistan’s concern whether it would be treated as a partner or a target is justified.
The GICNT aims at bringing together experience and expertise from the nonproliferation, counterproliferation and counterterrorism disciplines and integrating the collective capabilities and resources to strengthen the overall global architecture to combat nuclear terrorism. It also provides an opportunity for nations to share information and expertise in a legally non-binding environment.
In compliance with GICNT, Pakistan has put in place legislative, regulatory and administrative infrastructure to prevent and combat any possible acts of terrorism involving nuclear and radiological materials and facilities. After having done so much, the country, however, still remains under severe international pressure with regard to safety and security of its nuclear arsenal, illicit trafficking of nuclear material, etc.
All the CP initiatives are extremely important but UNSCR 1540 is significant for two reasons: It calls on all states to make domestic export control and nonproliferation laws and secondly this resolution has been passed under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, hence it is binding on all states. This is a clear manifestation of use of force in case of noncompliance. If the states don’t do as the resolution says, then there would be coercion by use of force. Interestingly, this is the first international nonproliferation resolution that has been supplemented and backed by the use of force. The use of force, of course, is the hallmark of the US counter-proliferation strategy.
All these initiatives put question mark for Pakistan and its nonproliferation policy. Will there be new pressures, will there be sustained pressures or will there be no pressures? And how will Pakistan need to respond?
Pakistan’s dilemma is that on the one hand it is faced with these international pressures and on the other hand it is faced with its own competing energy needs. By implication, these initiatives should not mean to hinder Pakistan’s access to global energy market. But owing to the growing significance of the new initiatives, Pakistan needs to see that do it has a choice but to harmonise its commercial activity with global trends? Is the country compelled to join these initiatives for economic imperatives? And if for economic benefits or whatever reason it joins these initiatives, Pakistan needs to ensure that they do not impinge on its sovereignty. Pakistan needs to see if it is part of the problem or part of a solution.
The post-9/11 world has witnessed the emergence of non-consultative, customised unilaterally driven measures being adopted which is manifestation of a shift from multilaterally negotiated treaties. Is this the new way to devise international standards? Global security in the 21st century is only attainable through global cooperation which of course signifies the importance of multilateralism.
Pakistan has been playing an active role at multilateral forums such as CD Geneva, UN 1st Committee, etc, where the country is considered a key player. Pakistan has acted as a buffer state for upholding sometimes restive pressures of international nonproliferation regime by upholding multilateralism. Pakistan still stands by to its commitment to multilateralism. It firmly believes that all the new counter-proliferation measures should also be brought into the multilateral forums such as CD and be multilaterally negotiated there. These should be benefitting all rather than promoting only the US interests overseas. These institutions require more investment in terms of legality, credibility, productivity and transparency.
The Obama administration has shown interest in multilateral engagement expressing its intention of making the PSI and the GICNT durable international institutions. President Barack Obama has called for a nuclear-free world, saying that he wants an immediate end to nuclear tests. Therefore, he has confirmed he would seek Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and would hold a global summit on nuclear security next year.
A unified response is essential for controlling the WMD proliferation and that can come only through exercising multilateralism rather than unilateralism enshrined in bilateralism.