NUCLEAR TERRORISM
By
Sobia Saeed Paracha (Research Fellow)
April 23, 2009
“It would be a milestone, timely for ongoing efforts to consolidate the non-proliferation regime, combat nuclear terrorism and strengthen nuclear safety.” Mohammed El Baradei
The threat of Nuclear Terrorism posed by non-state actors is transnational in nature. The concept pre-existed the end of cold war, but was dominated by the issues such as balance of nuclear terror and competing ideologies between former Soviet Union and USA. With the end of the cold war the major threat against international security was perceived to be emanating from smaller and more amorphous sources, such as small armed groups and terrorist organizations, rather than a nuclear armed conflicting super power. In the mid-nineties the issue was given greater consideration in the international strategic debate.
A nuclear terrorist attack can be defined as an incident where a terrorist organization uses a nuclear device to cause mass killing and devastation. It also comprises of use or threat of use of, fissionable or radiological devices to assault a nuclear installation for causing mass dispersal of radiation.
Graham Allison explains the threat with a simple equation: “what is the world’s most destructive technology? Nuclear, who are the world’s most dangerous actors? Terrorists, It is feared that someday someone may resort to nuclear terrorism simply as a surprise or an adventure.” Although no radioactive device has ever been detonated by terrorist anywhere in the world but the fixing of a canister containing radioactive material like Cesium-137 in Moscow in mid 1990s was a clear evidence of the intent and capability of terrorists to acquire and use radioactive materials for the purpose of terrorism.
There are four broadly outlined threats related to nuclear terrorism given generally by analysts, which can be as follows:
The threat of use of nuclear terrorism as a policy instrument by non-state actors has been highlighted even more after the 9/11 terrorists attacks in USA. This gave birth to a new trend in the international non-proliferation debate, being led primarily by USA, towards counter-proliferation. The major tools of counter-proliferation are meant directly or indirectly, to curb the possibility of nuclear materials or technology falling in the hands of non-state actors. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism is the most ambitious and direct, initiative between states to combat nuclear terrorism, which dove-tails the procedures of other Counter-proliferation instruments like CSI, PSI and MPI. This may involve rigorous oversight, surveillance and interdiction. In addition to GICNT, the adoption of UNSCR 1540 is also a milestone against the prospects of nuclear terrorism. It directly deals with establishment of stringent national export control regimes to check the nuclear materials falling in the hands of non-state actors and illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear materials and technology.
The obligation to safety and security of nuclear assets is being merged with the threat of nuclear terrorism, where the world is focusing major attention towards securing the orphan sources and undermining their possibility of falling in the hands of rogue elements. The Physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities is considered as the first line of defense against possible acts of terrorism. This has become a general trend to relate the threat of nuclear terrorism with horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons and to decrease the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons, especially developing countries. To limit the acquisition of nuclear weapons and other technologies only from developing countries is a flawed idea taken as one of the guarantees against nuclear terrorism, especially when linked to their safety and security regimes. This is said so because there have been evidences of security lapses at nuclear facilities even in the western and developed world, where even the most modern and state of the art laboratories of United States were caught to have flawed security, nuclear material lying outside the facilities unaccounted for and the famous B-52 bomber case.
Today nuclear terrorism is a prospective threat beyond doubt to the humankind, which is a universal concern, requiring a universal response.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is considered to be real for international security and has been asserted time and again, with the fresh surge coming from the White House with Obama cast the leadership (here I want to add the word democrat). This was clear in Obama’s Prague speech, which outlines the agenda for nuclear technology in the next decade and then more recently in the Strategic Posture Review 2010. The main areas defined to start progress in both the Prague speech and the NPR 2010 i.e. inter alia the safety and security parameters of nuclear materials and technology, as well as preventing their illicit trafficking and proliferation to counter the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Nuclear terrorism has been identified as the greatest threat to US national security in the new nuclear posture review, which marks a shift in the nuclear policy of US. Conventionally the role of nuclear weapons was to deter the nuclear threats coming from China and Russia, which now has shifted to countering nuclear terrorism and preventing nuclear proliferation. One way or the other, these issues remained at the international agenda since the inception of nuclear weapons, the real problem at hand is whether the US would try to tackle with the threat unilaterally or utilize a multilateral platform to device policies to counter nuclear terrorism. Although leaders from other nations have also been communicating their concerns regarding nuclear terrorism yet the disproportionate alarm in the US policy making circles would practically link the threat exclusively to US national security. Because of the international acceptance of the idea, this will legitimately allow US to take preventive actions, as was evident in the case of Iraq.
This will put into question the export controls and related safety and security measures of many developing nations. It holds enormous implications for the states which have or are alleged to have insecure nuclear materials or facilities. These materials as contended, could well be at the disposal of the terrorists. Due to the problem of perception, concerns are shown by the international community regarding the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear complex led by negative propaganda of the Indian and western media mostly based on the assumption of Pakistan’s close vicinity to Afghanistan and terrorist attacks in Pakistan. This calls for an extra effort on the part of the Pakistani nuclear policy makers to realize the issues, perceive the real threats that relate more to international relations than technical problems of nuclear safety and security and take actions accordingly.
The ongoing war against terror on one hand is deteriorating the national security and economy of the country, while on the other it is also assumed by the accusers to be responsible for legitimizing the threats to the security of nuclear complex. Pakistan has been improving and trying to prove its nuclear security policy since 1998, but could only get fluctuating responses from the international nuclear agenda setters. The new emphasize in the realm of nuclear terrorism calls for further improving the nuclear security related export controls, legislation, penalties and intelligence sharing. The enhanced nuclear cooperation at the end of the western powers might itself be perceived as threatening the nuclear security of Pakistan and infringing upon the country’s sovereignty. Secondly the idea to sign-up for accounting the weapons grade materials and that too coupled with international cooperation might seek the exposure of sensitive information and undermining the deterrence capabilities of Pakistan.
An extreme possibility can be to shape international cooperation against nuclear terrorism in the form of a Cooperative Threat Reduction type program and its application in Pakistan in line with the experience in the Former Soviet Union states. The CTR program helped the US to decommission and destroy 6312 nuclear warheads, hundreds of silos, intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear test tunnels, nuclear submarines and bombers leading to massive cuts in the Russian nuclear arsenal and denuclearizing rest of the erstwhile Soviet Union states mostly, on their own expenses. A CTR in Pakistan on one hand might upgrade security of the already reasonably secure nuclear complex of Pakistan (add paras). On the other this will also help the US to cap the Pakistani nuclear weapons program, by providing direct institutional access to sensitive programs. Viewing the history of western animosity to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program it is very clear that: if provided a chance US will try to reverse Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program The ease of institutional access will provide an opportunity to freeze the advancement of nuclear weapons program.. Application of a CTR in Pakistan looks quite plausible on the cards, with reference to provisions of the controversial Kerry-Lugar Bill and the statements given by US senators related to CTR, propaganda pieces emerging in the media and a few academic journals, the US efforts to secure Pakistani nuclear complex and most importantly the current US emphasize on the issue of nuclear terrorism.
In the case of Pakistan the debate threatens its nuclear deterrence capabilities by unreasonably questioning the safety/security and command and control capabilities thereby diminishing credibility of its nuclear arsenal. This also discredits the Pakistani institutions responsible for the nuclear policy making and puts them on the defensive, always justifying their capabilities rather than negotiating a better deal for the country.
The goal of international security and countering nuclear terrorism are noble, but they should not threaten the national security of a country and should be pursued through criterion based and realistic approaches. Currently the debate about a world without nuclear weapons and eliminating the threat of use of nuclear weapons in any shape, be it terrorism or aggression between two countries, put Pakistan as the primary source of concern along with North Korea and Iran. It is important to realize the difference between all the three and there specific national security interests as well. The states that compromise and operate with the international community should be given incentives too. In the case of Pakistan the divide between legality and reality i.e. Pakistan being a defacto nuclear weapons state should also be incorporated in the nuclear non-proliferation regime, should be bridged rather than delegitimizing the Pakistani nuclear weapons program. It is required to understand the concerns of the states outside the non-proliferation regime before entering into any new commitments and expecting the countries to cooperate on the international agenda before addressing their national security interests.