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by Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi (Senior Associate Fellow, SASSI)
STRATEGIC dialogue with the United States marks a new stage in the upturn in our bilateral relationship, the first milestone being Pakistan’s designation as a non-Nato ally in 2004, followed by the Kerry-Lugar enactment last year.
During this process of reconnecting, we cannot help but recall that our relations with the US have always oscillated between friendship and alienation, and between the convergence of views and the divergence of perceptions. This time round, we should examine what causes the volatility in our relationship.
It is first necessary to understand the nature of our relationship, which is asymmetric. The US is one of the richest countries in the world, endowed with high industrial and commercial productivity. Most importantly, it is the world’s preponderant military power with all the attributes of a global power. Such global powers have global interests.
Pakistan, meanwhile, is much smaller, poorer, socially backward and economically underdeveloped. It is weaker militarily (despite our nuclear capability) and is a regionally oriented power (our concerns vis-à-vis India, Afghanistan and on occasion Iran). Then there is our perennial political instability, marked by the lack of continuity and consistency in policies and the consequent lack of direction. There is thus a glaring asymmetry in our respective positions. It is all very well to say that we are two sovereign and independent nations which deal with each other as equals, but the reality is very different.
Due to our poverty and backwardness, we look towards the US for many of our needs. We need investment in all areas of economic and social development, trade concessions, technology for our industries, and higher education and training for our students. We also need military equipment and hardware for our defence needs. Then we look to the US for political support on major international issues where our national interest is involved.
Unfortunately for us, a hundred countries or so around the world also need the same kind of things from the US. This situation is not fully comprehended in Pakistan’s public opinion.
Fortunately, however, the United States also needs us — at least from time to time. The US has needed us for pursuing its global objectives at various times in the past, and is currently in need of us again. Otherwise, we would rank amongst a long queue of states soliciting US help. We are relevant to the US because of our geographical location, which gives us strategic importance that few states have. Earlier, America needed Pakistan for its encirclement of the communist regimes in Russia and China. In the 80s, the US needed Pakistan to push the then Soviet forces out of Afghanistan, partly because it feared Soviet ingress into the warm waters of the Middle East. It also needed to defeat communism as an ideology.
Then, after the terrorist attacks on US territory on Sept 11, 2001, the US vowed to eliminate Al Qaeda and Islamic extremists. It felt that the evidence that was available plus its own intelligence showed that the masterminds of global terrorism, particularly Osama bin Laden, were based in the lawless regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They had to be rooted out and eliminated, and Pakistan’s cooperation was essential. Once again the US needed Pakistan, and badly so.
Pakistan’s relevance is the reason behind this new phase of US attention which began in 2002-03 and continues. In return, the US expects Pakistan to focus on the terrorism problem by diverting its military deployment in the east and toning down its political stance of confronting India, to dealing with Al Qaeda and Taliban presence in its territory. Additionally, Pakistan is expected to help the US defeat these elements in Afghanistan. While there seems to be broad convergence on this approach between the two countries, Pakistan wants the US to put pressure on India to resolve the Kashmir dispute as well as other bilateral problems, so that it does not have to worry about its eastern border.
The US balks at becoming Pakistan’s advocate with India, yet also insists that Pakistan must go all out to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban on its territory. These respective demands and expectations are the source of the tension in the Pakistan-US interaction, despite the upturn.
Due to the asymmetry between our two states and the cross-purposes involved, this upturn will not last forever. US interest in Pakistan is currently strong, but it does not consider this as vital to its national interests as it does, for example, the security of Israel. It is determined to combat Al Qaeda and the Taliban but could conceivably find other ways of dealing with them if Pakistan does not play ball. Thus the Pakistan connection, though convenient, is not entirely indispensable. Secondly, as in the past, the US will move on to other issues/areas once the terror threat subsides. In such a situation, Pakistan will be back at the end of the queue for receiving American favours.
We must therefore take the renewed US interest in Pakistan for what it is worth. We can avail of US favours for as long as they are forthcoming, but we should be prepared for fending for ourselves when they cease. By avoiding dependency, we should make use of the US as is best for us and avoid unrealistic expectations. The US will give us economic and military assistance but it does not currently seem prepared to give us civilian nuclear technology. One important reason is that the Washington non-proliferation community and more importantly, Congress, are not ready to approve. Much lobbying will have to be done before this becomes possible. Even more unlikely is American help in solving our disputes with India, if India is unwilling.
Our relationship with the US cannot be one of permanence and consistency, as it is not based on a vital or abiding interest of the US. Further, it is subject to US priorities, which continue to change. We should realise that this is the nature of our relationship, and not sulk when America turns away again.