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by Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi (Senior Associate Fellow, SASSI)
The objective of nuclear non-proliferation, which essentially means non-diversion of nuclear material to military uses, is enshrined in the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which is now adhered to by 188 countries. However, it has not yet achieved its target of universal adherence and there are three notable non-signatories of the Treaty, Israel, India and Pakistan. Meanwhile, a new problem has manifested itself in recent years, when signatory countries began threatening to opt out of the treaty, which is possible under Article 10 of its provisions. Thus North Korea (DPRK) gave notice to withdrawal from the NPT in 1993, deferred it for some years in view of a bilateral Agreed framework Agreement signed with the US in 1994, but finally withdrew from the NPT in January 2003. It also announced in 2004 that it possessed nuclear weapons. The present status of North Korea as a NPT signatory is ambiguous as it has not clarified whether it has revoked its withdrawal or not.
Then there is the case of Iran, which is under verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and was reported to the Security Council by the Agency for non-compliance of its safeguards commitments. Iranian leaders have often threatened to withdraw from the NPT if Iran is denied its statutory right to have own nuclear fuel cycle, whereby it can process natural uranium to enriched uranium.
To top it all, there is the fear that if DPRK and Iran can get away with quitting the NPT, lesser nuclear aspirant states, scared by the apparent erosion of non-proliferation may move to free themselves of the constraints of the NPT, and thus bring about the collapse of the entire non-proliferation regime. To access the future of nuclear non-proliferation, it would be worthwhile to look at the history of this concept and its evolution over the last sixty years or so.
In the first place, it is necessary to recall the circumstances under which the NPT was conceived and drafted. It all began with the creation of an atomic Bomb which was result of a panic reaction by émigré scientists from Europe who fled to the US in the wake of Hitler’s assumption of power. However, as soon as the Bomb became a reality, the Manhattan project scientists put on record their grave apprehensions on taking such a terrible step, and their fear of an unlimited nuclear arms race in the future. As the genie was out of the bottle, they proposed an international agreement to account for all uranium into fissile material. While a number of countries acquired nuclear weapons capability in the meantime, such an agreement continued to elude the international community. Many years later the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was eventually concluded in 1968 and came into effect in 1970. But the treaty, as it materialized, was inherently flawed as it excluded five countries from the non-proliferation purview which had already acquired nuclear weapons, and thus created a differentiation that doomed its universal application from the moment it came into effect. Instead of establishing universal nuclear disarmament, which was the desire of the worried scientists, it instituted a system which gave the power of the genie to some, and sought to put it back in the bottle for others.
The emerging matrix of global nuclear capabilities has become a complex conundrum where no order can be established. In the first place, the discriminatory character of the nuclear non-proliferation regime established by the NPT is not acceptable to some countries. As we noted the DPRK has broken out and Iran may try to break out the regime. Global insecurity can lead various other NPT signatories also to withdraw from the regime. Second nuclear technology has become so well-known and is even available through illicit networks and recalcitrant scientists in Russian and former Soviet Republics, that it is sought to be acquired by aspirants of national power in many smaller and less important countries. Finally, the NPT itself is in trouble, as was seen in the NPT Review Conference in New York in 2005. It is interesting that it took the Conference nearly two weeks (where the author was present) to even agree on an agenda, and at the end of it, no consensus could be achieved on any substantive point.
The difficulty of enforcement of the NPT provisions is not new. Like any international treaty it depends, for its observance, on the commitment and resolve of its members. This factor is variable, and many countries have been found to be Iax in their adherence to its non-proliferation principles. Long award of this, NPT countries have established over the years, global enforcement groups or committees like the Nuclear Support Group and Zangger Committee. These bodies try to ensure denial of supply of nuclear technology or material to non-NPT countries, or even those countries suspected of violating its observance. Given the state of proliferation that seems to prevail, their success or effectiveness is far from satisfactory.
The question thus begs itself whether the NPT with its discriminatory approach, its weak adherence and its poor enforcement can stop nuclear non-proliferation and clear the nuclear imbroglio. More important can imperfect NPT regime hold? If not, it can theoretically either be strengthened or made more flexible. Given the lack-luster record of NPT, it is interesting that both these efforts are in evidence. On the strengthening front, some new initiatives have been taken by the IAEA, the enforcement arm of the NPT, to bring it about.
It is recently created Advisory Committee of the Board of Governors for finding ways and means of strengthening the safeguards mechanism. The Director General of IAEA has also proposed some kind of international control of the nuclear fuel cycle. Secondly, the Security Council has adopted a Counter-Proliferation Initiatives (CPI) and G-8 countries have launched a Proliferation Initiative (PSI), which will help restrict the unauthorized traffic of nuclear technology or material. All these ideas are aimed at strengthening the NPT, or measures designed to help put the genie back into bottle. The important question is whether these steps will work. On the other hand, there are signs that the NPT more inclusive, by bringing India into fold, and perhaps later Israel and Pakistan, through similar bilateral arrangements that the US can arrive at. Some months before the Indo-US nuclear deal was signed late last year, the IAEA Director General had argued strongly, in public for a and the IAEA Board of Governors meetings, that Israel, India and Pakistan were brought into the non-proliferation regime it will remain ineffective. However, both the strengthening efforts and the US initiative for a kind of restricted flexibility (since American officials have ruled out similar deals for the other non-signatories of the NPT) are still far from realization.
In the meantime, the NPT remains in limbo, its future uncertain and universal non-proliferation is only possible if there is complete and general disarmament, which is unlikely as long as the nuclear weapons states keep their nuclear arsenals intact, which takes us back to square one, the point where Manhattan project scientists began from. The genie is out of the bottle, and some wants to keep it out and utilize its services, while denying it to all others. That unfortunately is not likely to happen, despite recent calls for nuclear zero. The fortune is non-proliferation might, therefore, well be doomed.